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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy out-
age probability of random wireless networks from the
perspective of the k-th best source, which has still not
been well characterized. We consider the artificial noise
(AN) transmission strategy at source nodes to confuse the
eavesdropper. Furthermore, we use a concept of security-
region based on the k-th best source index. This is
pragmatic in creating a protected communication zone for
the typical destination and also in bounding the number
of sources that can cooperate in a Coordinated Multi-
point transmission (CoMP) network. We further derive
the secrecy outage probability for these CoMP sources
based on the security-region. We also provide a closed-form
expression for the maximum number of eavesdroppers for a
given secrecy outage constraint, which can effect the secure
communication. Tractable numerical results are presented
under various assumptions of densities, antenna gains, AN
transmission factors and path loss exponents.
Index Terms—Secrecy outage, random wireless net-
works, stochastic geometry, fading, k-th best source index.
I. INTRODUCTION
The key goals of future generation wireless commu-
nication systems include billions of connected devices,
data rates in the range of Gbps, lower latencies, increased
reliability, improved coverage and environment-friendly,
low-cost, and energy efficient operation. Therefore, wire-
less security is becoming increasingly crucial in such
communication systems, leading researchers to investi-
gate information theoretic approaches to achieve secrecy
in the wireless channel. Considerable efforts have been
made by authors in [1]–[4] to develop information-
theoretic security, which enhances the chance of a secure
communication in the presence of eavesdroppers.
It is worth mentioning that the contribution [1] of
Wyner lies in the introduction of the notion of wiretap
channel for the discrete memoryless channel. Later on,
the concept of wiretap channel has been extended to
generalized channels, such as additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channels by Cheong and Hellman [2],
and broadcast wireless channel by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[3].
In recent past, a considerable amount of reasearch
has been done on intrinsic secrecy in random wireless
networks [5]–[8]. In this direction, artificial noise (AN)
transmission is shown to be one of key approaches
to guarantee security provided that the instantaneous
channel state information (CSI) of each eavesdropper is
not available [5]. The transmitter uses multiple antenna
to allocate some of the available power to transmit
artificially generated noise, in addition to the information
bearing signal, in the null-space of the channel of the
legitimate user. The objective of AN transmission is to
degrade the eavesdroppers channel so that the secrecy
capacity of the legitimate channel is achieved. Recently,
AN-aided secure transmission has gained immense re-
search interest. To mention some, in [6], the authors
adopted AN-aided secure communication to design the
maximal throughput scheme under secrecy constraint
where the CSI is updated adaptively through feedback.
Whereas [7], [9] analysed an achievable secrecy rate and
used this to optimise the transmitted power allocation
between AN and information signal. In this paper, we
also adopt a AN-aided secure communication where the
source nodes allocate some power to radiate AN to mask
the information signal from eavesdroppers.
On the other hand, considering user association crite-
ria in cellular networks, authors in [10] characterized the
secrecy outage probability of the k-th nearest receiver
(i.e., the index is based on the distance between the
source and the destination). Moving in this direction,
Vuppala et al. have proposed a novel concept of “security
region” [11], defined as the region in which the set
of ordered nodes can safely communicate with typi-
cal destination for a given secrecy outage constraint.
However, the results unveiled in [11] are limited to the
noise limited case. Moreover, the works [8], [10], [11]
do not exploit the Coordinated Multi-point transmission
(CoMP) from the perspective of security region.
In this paper, we address the mentioned challenges by
deriving the received k-th best signal to noise interfer-
ence ratio (SINR) distributions from the sources to the
destination and eavesdroppers and expressions for the
secrecy outage probability of random networks. We con-
struct the CoMP network using the concept of security-
region which is based on the K∗ best sources. Selecting
such best sources to coordinate among each other can
further improve the security of the network. At this point
we would like to state that this model is applicable to978-1-5386-3531-5/17/$31.00 c© 2017 IEEE
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any fading scenarios and also for models which include
colluding eavesdroppers. The contributions of this work
are multi-fold and are given as:
• For a given secrecy outage constraint, a novel
security-region concept is studied.
• We obtain closed-form expression for the limiting
number of ordered sources that can participate in
the CoMP.
• Finally, we derive the secrecy outage probability of
CoMP sources that include only the sources which
are within the security-region.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network in Euclidean space of di-
mension d, modeled by a homogeneous Poisson Point
Process (PPP) [12] with multiple source, destination
and eavesdropper nodes. The sources and eavesdroppers
location processes are denoted by Φs and Φe respectively
with corresponding densities λs and λe. All PPPs are
considered to be independent of each other. Without
loss of generality, the source nodes can be interpreted as
transmitters while the destination nodes and eavesdrop-
pers as receivers. The sources transmit with the power Pk
for k ∈ [1 : K], where K is the total number of sources
in the network. Without loss of generality, let the location
of a given destination node define the origin of the space.
Hereinafter, we consider the typical destination as the
center of our analyses.
We assume that source nodes use some portion of
the transmit power Pk, i.e. (1 − φ)Pk, to radiate AN
in the null-space the channel of the transmitter, leaving
the other portion of transmit power, φPk, to transmit
information bearing signal, provided that 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
For tractable analysis, we adopt a sectoring model with
AN from [13]. Therefore, each source node has a main
lobe of gain Gl with probability of angle of spread .
Whereas, during AN transmission, source node possesses
a main lobe of gain Ga with probability of angle of
spread 1 − . It is also assumed that the sectors of the
information signals and AN are non-overlapping.
With a slight abuse of notation, let’s consider Φs as
the sets of interfering source locations. Using stochastic
geometry tools, the interfering source nodes can be
divided into two independent PPPs: (1) source nodes,
Φls, that send information signals to the nearest receiver
with intensity λs; (2) source nodes, Φas , transmitting AN
to the receiver with intensity (1 − )λs for 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
As a result, the SINR at destination from a given k-th
source can be rewritten as
ζ˜k,
PkGk|hk|2rk−α
σ2k+
∑
i∈Φls
φPkGl|hi|2r−αi +
∑
i∈Φas
(1− φ)PkGa|hi|2r−αi
,
(1)
where Gk is the received gain at destination, hk denotes
the fading gain between a given source and destination;
rk is the distance between source and destination; σ2k
stands for AWGN power; and the path loss exponent
is denoted by α; hi denotes the fading gain between
interfering source and destination; and ri is the distance
between interfering source and destination.
In current model, multiple eavesdroppers are consid-
ered to coexist within the cellular network in the pres-
ence of interfering source nodes. Through cooperation,
the eavesdroppers jointly process the received signal and
thus can nullify the interference arising due to the infor-
mation signal among source nodes [14]. Therefore, the
aggregate interference at eavesdropper is only affected
by the AN transmission and AWGN. Readers are advised
to read [14, Section III-B] to get detailed insight on this
specific eavesdropping strategy. The resulting SINR at
eavesdropper ζ¯e is
ζ˜e ,
PkGe|he,k|2re−α
σ2e +
∑
i∈Φas
(1− φ)PkGa|he,i|2r−αi
, (2)
where Ge is the received gain at eavesdropper, he,k
denotes the fading gain between a given source and
eavesdropper; re is the distance between source and
eavesdropper; σ2e stands for AWGN power; he,i denotes
the fading gain between interfering source and eaves-
dropper; and re is the distance between interfering source
and eavesdropper.
Moreover, we focus on the worst-case eavesdropping
strategy where the secrecy performance of the system
based on solely on the most malicious eavesdropper with
the largest SINR of the received signal. Therefore, the
resulting SINR at the eavesdropper can be derived from
equation (2) as
ζˆe = max
e∈Φe
{
PkGe|he,k|2re−α
σ2e + Iae
}
, (3)
where Iae =
∑
i∈Φas
(1− φ)PkGa|he,i|2r−αi .
Thus, the secrecy capacity between any k-th source
and a typical destination is given as [15]
Cs = max{0, log2
(
1 + ζ˜k
)
− log2
(
1 + ζˆe
)
}bit/s/Hz,
(4)
The secrecy outage probability is defined as [15]
Pout , Pr{Cs < Rs} = Pr
{
log2
(
1+ζ˜k
1+ζˆe
)
< Rs
}
, (5)
where Rs denotes the required target secrecy rate.
The secrecy outage probability between the source and
destination node (in the presence of randomly located
multiple eavesdroppers) can be derived from (5) as [8],
[11], [15]
Pout =
∞∫
0
(1− Fζˆe(β(y)))fζ˜k(y)dy, (6)
where β(y) = [2Rs(1 + y) − 1], fζ and Fζ denote the
probability density function and the cumulative density
fuction of ζ respectively.
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Let us consider the case where the typical destination
is able to identify which of its candidate sources has the
maximum SINR, subsequently associating to that best
source. In such system, we now define a metric, security-
region, from the perspective of the best source index.
Note that, this concept of security-region is significantly
different from the security region as described in [16].
It can be defined as the region in which the set of
ordered K∗ nodes can safely communicate with typical
destination for a given secrecy outage constraint. These
set of K∗ nodes are the nodes that combine to form the
CoMP network. To analyze such scenario with coordi-
nated multi-point sources, we assume that all the sources
exchange required ideal information amongst themselves
through a backhaul connection.
S , {(K∗, ),∀K∗ ∈ {1, · · · , k∗},Pout ≤ }, (7)
where k∗ is the limiting value of K for a given secrecy
outage constraint. This limiting value, which defines the
security-region will be computed in following section.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE AND MAXIMAL LIMIT
In this section, first we characterize the SINR distri-
butions for the k-th best source and best eavesdropper.
Afterwards, with possession of these SINR distributions
of channels from sources to the destination node and
the best eavesdropper, the secrecy outage probability is
characterized. Finally, we devise a limit on the k-th best
source to construct the security region using the secrecy
outage constraint.
A. Received SINR Distributions
In this section, we intend to characterize the secrecy
outage probability of a communication link between k-
th best source and typical destination. Hence, the dis-
tributions of interest concerning the legitimate network
are those corresponding to the SINR of each legitimate
source ζk. In contrast, for a given legitimate SINR
ζk what determines the secrecy capacity of a chan-
nel subjected to fading is not a specific eavesdropper,
but rather the eavesdropper with the maximum SINR
amongst them.
Lemma 1. The received SINR distribution of best eaves-
dropper can be given as [17]
Fζˆe(z) = exp
(
−piλez
−2
α Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
))
, (8)
and, an integral-form expression for Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
under
Rayleigh fading channel follows from Appendix B, is
given as
Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
=
2
α
∞∫
0
x
2
α−1e
−z σ2e
PkGe EIae
[
e
−zIae
PkGe
]
, (9)
where
EIse
[
exp
(−zIae
PkGe
)]
= e
−
pi(1−)λiz
2
α
(
(1−φ)GaGe
) 2
α
sinc(
2
α ) .
(10)
Proof. A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.
In the context of our analytical framework, this as-
sumption implies that the secrecy capacity of the channel
in question is governed by the statistics of the maximum
SINR amongst the sources. One can find the SINR
distribution of best source using the similar approach
from Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. The SINR distribution of the best source to
the destination (ζˆk) can be given as
Fζˆk(z) = exp
(
−piλsz
−2
α Eξk
(
ξ
2
α
k
))
, (11)
where
Eξk
(
ξ
2
α
k
)
=
2
α
∞∫
0
x
2
α−1e
−z σ2k
PkGk
∏
j∈s,a
EIjk
[
e
−zIj
k
PkGk
]
.
(12)
where EIjk [.] follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 1.
Subsequently, we consider the case where the user
connect to the node with the k-th best SINR, i.e., the k-th
source provides the destination with the k-th maximum
SINR.
Lemma 3. The SINR distribution of the k-th best source
(ζ`k) can be given as
Fζ`k(z) =
Γ
(
(2Rsz)
−2
α Ξk, k
)
(k − 1)! , (13)
where Ξk = piλsEξk
(
ξ
2
α
k
)
.
Proof. This proof follows from [11, Proposition 3].
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Now, considering Lemma 3, the secrecy outage prob-
ability with respect to the k-th best source can be given
in following proposition.
Proposition 1. The secrecy outage probability for the
link between the destination and the k-th best source in
presence of the n-th best eavesdropper can be given as
Pout =
k−1∑
j=0
Γ(j+n)2
−2jRs
α
j! Γ(n)Ξ−jk Ξ
−n
e
(
1
2
−2Rs
α Ξk + Ξe
)j+n
,
(14)
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where Ξe = piλeEξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
.
Proof. The derivation of this proof follows straightfor-
wardly by substituting the received SINR distributions of
the typical destination and an eavesdropper in equation
(6), and hence intermediate steps are omitted here due
to space constraints.
C. Maximal Limit
Now, in the following proposition we characterize the
security-region of our system. From Proposition 1, one
can obtain the maximum possible k-th index for a given
secrecy outage constraint ω.
Proposition 2. The limiting number of ordered sources
that can securely communicate with the destination in
presence of the best eavesdropper can be given as
k∗ = log Υ
Υ+1
(1− ω) . (15)
Proof : By defining Υ = 2
−2Rs
α Ξk
Ξe
, Pout in Eq. (14)
can be re-written for the best eavesdropper case i.e n = 1
as
Pout =
k−1∑
j=0
Υj
(Υ + 1)j+1
. (16)
The Eq. (16) can be expressed as a geometric series
as
Pout =
(
1
Υ + 1
)
1− ( ΥΥ+1 )k
1− ΥΥ+1
. (17)
Finally, the limiting value of K, i.e k∗, sources for
a given secrecy outage constraint ω can be given from
above equation (17) as
k∗ = log Υ
Υ+1
(1− ω) . (18)
This shows that in CoMP networks, it may not be
useful to consider all the sources in the network. Instead,
it is important to take into consideration only the limiting
number of sources as stated in the previous proposition.
To draw another parallel with the literature on random
networks, if cooperation is a part of the communication
system used by legitimate nodes, it must be assumed that
the same strategy will be exploited by eavesdroppers as
well. The expressions derived in this paper may also be
applicable to the scenario when the eavesdroppers are
cooperating. This eavesdropper’s cooperation can also
be interpreted as collusion among the eavesdroppers.
Therefore, we give a bound on maximum number of such
eavesdroppers which can effect the communication for a
given secrecy outage constraint in following proposition.
Proposition 3. The maximum number of eavesdroppers
that effects the secure communication for a given secrecy
outage constraint  can be computed as
n∗ = log 1
Υ+1
(ω) . (19)
Proof. This proof is obtained from Proposition 2 by
keeping k = 1.
IV. SECRECY ANALYSIS OF COMP
This scenario provides maximum achievable secrecy
capacity and tells the network designer the number of
K best sources sufficient to achieve the ultimate secrecy
performance of the network.
In this section we consider a CoMP network of
sources based on the security-region. We assume that
only the sources within the security-region are allowed
to coordinate among each other to form the CoMP
network. Since the security-region depends on the source
node’s secrecy outage probability, the set of sources
that fall within the security-region may be considered
as an inhomogeneous Poisson point process which can
be obtained via location-dependent thinning of Φs. To
this end, the Matern hardcore point process models are
more suitable. Unfortunately, the probability generating
functionals does not exist in most of cases [18], [19].
But, it has been said in [18], [20] that the nodes further
away from the hard core distance, d can still be modelled
as a PPP with a approximated density. Hence we assume
that the total limiting number of sources to follow a
Poisson distribution while they are still non-uniformly
located within the coverage area of the cell due to
thinning. Therefore, the set of transmitting best sources
follow inhomogeneous PPP Φ¯c with a density of λ¯c.
Now, the distribution of the equivalent aggregate source
path gain ζ¯k is required in order to characterize the
secrecy rate of random networks. Thus, we have
ζ¯k =
∑
x∈Φ¯c
|hx|2||rx||−α. (20)
Now, the set of interfering source node locations1,
i.e., non-cooperating source nodes can be denoted as Φ¯s
with density λ¯s. Hence, the SINR distribution in CoMP
scenario is given as [21]
ζ¯k =
∑
x∈Φ¯c
PkGk|hx|2rx−α
σ2k + I¯k
, (21)
where I¯k =
∑
i∈Φ¯ls
φPkGl|hi|2r−αi +
∑
i∈Φ¯as
(1 −
φ)PkGa|hi|2r−αi .
In general case, the CoMP aggregates the power of
all information signals to improve the communication
rate. However, the aggregation of all the signals from
the nodes which do not have sufficient power may not
be a good practise. Thus, it is important to select the
best nodes for the aggression process which can leads
to minimum secrecy outage. In the following Lemma,
we will provide a closed-form expressions for such
aggregation by leveraging the analysis from [21].
1Note that, the nodes that do not cooperate among each other are
the ones that do not participate to form the security region.
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Lemma 4. The CDF of the aggregate SINR in CoMP
scenario with interference can be given as
Fζ¯k(z) = 1−
∫
0<ξ1<···ξK<∞
(22)
Lσ2k
(
z∑
c∈Φ¯c
x−1c
)∏
j∈s,a
LI¯jk
(
z∑
c∈Φ¯c
x−1c
)
fξ(xc)dxc,
where
Lσ2(t) = e−
t σ2k
PkGk (23)
fξ(x) =
∏
s∈Φ¯c
2
αpiλ¯c x
2
α−1e−piλ¯cx
2
α , (24)
and, LI¯s/ak (.) follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. A sketch of proof is given in Appendix C.
Using equation (4), the secrecy outage probability
(Rs = 0) is given by
Pout =
∞∫
0
Fζ¯k(z)fζˆe(z)dz, (25)
where fζˆe(z) can be obtained by taking derivative of
F¯ζe(z) in (8) and Fζ¯k(z) follows from Lemma 4. Unfor-
tunately the above integral does not admit closed-form.
However, one can evaluate the integral numerically.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Unless stated otherwise, we consider the follow-
ing simulation parameters: λs = 0.00001, λe =
0.00005, Pt = 0 dB,  = 0.1, φ = 0.1, Gk = Ge =
Gl = 5 dB, Ga = −5 dB and α = 2.5. Also the
target rate is kept constant at Rs = 0.1 bit/s/Hz. Fig.
1 shows the secrecy outage probability as a function
of the k-th best source index for various target secrecy
rates. It is evident from the figure that as we increase
the best source index, the secrecy outage probability also
increases. The best source index can be interpreted either
in terms of the path gain or fading gain from the source.
Here, we also stress on the fact that the increase in the
path loss exponent degrades the eavesdropper channel
worse which leads to decrease in the secrecy outage
probability. It is also intuitively clear from the figure that
the increasing target secrecy rate leads to an increase in
the secrecy outage probability.
Following the footprints of Fig. 1, we now plot the
secrecy outage probability as function of k-th best source
index in Fig. 2 for different values of λe and φ. Similar
settings are considered in Fig. 2 except for the path loss
exponent and target secrecy rate. We can conclude that
when the typical destination is receiving from the k-th
source node, the secrecy outage probability increases in
k-th Best Source Index
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Se
cr
ec
y O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
R
s
 = { 0.1, 0.5, 1 }
 R
s
 = { 0.1, 0.5, 1 }
α = 2.5
α = 3
Fig. 1: Secrecy outage probability as a function of k-th
best source index for different Rs.
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Fig. 2: Secrecy outage probability as a function of k-th
best source index for different λe.
an ascending order. It is also clear from the figure that the
increasing density of eavesdroppers leads to an increase
in the secrecy outage probability, and this phenomena
is well proved in recent literature on secrecy. But the
important point to consider is that with decreasing the
fraction of total transmitted power, φ, the secrecy ca-
pacity improves slightly. This is because the low values
of φ implies allocating higher share of power to convey
AN rather than information bearing signal. In turn, it
increases the density source nodes which will ultimately
degrade the eavesdropper’s channel and thus, yields an
improved secrecy capacity. Therefore, we can conclude
from Fig.1 and Fig. 2 that the eavesdropper density, the
path loss exponent, the transmit power fraction φ and
the k-th source index play a major role in determining
the secrecy capacity.
Leveraging from Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we now depict
the mentioned results from the point of view of the
security-region in Fig. 3. This figure plots the results
derived in Proposition 2. We show the limiting value of
K sources located inside the security-region that can be
accommodated for a given secrecy outage constraint ω.
These sources inside the security-region can participate
to form the CoMP sources. Some important results that
can be seen from the figure are: 1) the total number
of sources taking part in the communication increases
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with the increase in secrecy outage probability constraint
and 2) the total number of sources that can affect the
communication decreases with the increase in received
gain at eavesdropper. The first result can be explained
as - relaxing the outage constraint allows the system
to accommodate more number of users at the cost of
security. The second result can be explained fact that
the increase in gain allows the eavesdropper to intercept
the secure communication.
Finally in Fig. 4 we compare the secrecy outage
probability as a function of eavesdropper density for
different values of the probability of angle spread  and
cooperating source node densities. It can be concluded
from the figure that as the probability of angle of
spread  increases, the outage probability of system
increases. This phenomena can be explained the fact
that higher  values imply that an increased main lobe
gain for source nodes to transmit information signal.
Hence, less power will be allocated for AN transmission
irrespective of available total transmit power. As a result,
the eavesdropper channel will suffer a little as a result
of AN transmission. We can conclude from the figure
that the more the gain is allocated to transmit AN, the
worse the eavesdropper channel becomes; consequently,
the higher the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
is achieved. Furthermore, increasing the density of co-
operating sources, reduces the probability of secrecy
outage. It is also evident from all figures that the secrecy
capacity of CoMP sources outperforms the best source,
which is quite intuitive.
An interesting outcome of the analysis is that the un-
certainty of the number of sources communicating safely
with the typical destination does not play a role any more
with the introduction of the security-region. Furthermore,
the path loss exponents, AN transmission factor such as
φ and , antenna gains and the eavesdropper density also
play a crucial role in determining the security-region.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, the secrecy outage probability Pout is
derived with respect to the received SINR from the k-
th best source. Based on this result, security-region is
defined and a bound on the number of sources that can
cooperate among each other to form the CoMP network
is given. Specifically, it is show that CoMP sources
within the security-region enhances the achievable se-
crecy capacity of the network. Furthermore, the benefit
of AN-aided secure communication is illustrated in con-
junction with CoMP networks. Moreover, the analysis
presented in this paper can be helpful in determining the
number of eavesdroppers which impact the performance
of the collusion pool.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let Φe =
{
xi , r−α
}
be a path gain process. By
using Mapping theorem [22], the density function of this
point process can be given as
λ(x) =
2piλe
α
x
−2
α −1. (26)
Let ξe = PkGe|he,k|2/(Iae + σ2e ). Since our propaga-
tion process Φs is also affected by fading and interfer-
ence, i.e Φ = {yi , ξixi}, the density of this marked
point process using the displacement theorem [22] can
be written as
λˆ(y) =
∞∫
0
λ(x)ρ(x, y) dx, (27)
where
ρ(x, y) =
d
dy
(1− Fξe(y/x)) = − yx2 fξe(y/x). (28)
Thus (27) becomes
λˆ(y) =
1
αi
∞∫
0
2piλex
−2
α −1ρ(x, y) dx,
(z= yx )=
1
α
2piλe y
−2
α −1
∞∫
0
z
2
α fξe(z) dz,
=
1
α
2piλe y
−2
α −1Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
. (29)
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where the characterisation of Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
is given in
Appendix B under Rayleigh fading. The proof concludes
by evaluating the path gain distribution for best source
using void probability of a PPP.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF Eξe (.)
Let
ξe =
PkGe|he,k|2
Iae + σ2e
. (30)
Under the assumption of Rayleigh fading channel, the
CCDF of conditional SINR distribution, F¯ξe(z) is given
as
F¯ξe(z) = exp
(−z σ2e
PkGe
)
EIae
[
exp
(−zIae
PkGe
)]
. (31)
Following the footprints of the proof of [8, Lemma 1],
the expectation (Laplace function) of Iae thus becomes
EIsd
[
e
−zIae
PkGe
]
=e
−
pi(1− )λiz
2
α
(
(1−φ) GaGe
) 2
α
sinc( 2α ) . (32)
The proof concludes after calculating the partial mo-
ment of ξe using (31) as below
Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
=
2
α
∞∫
0
x
2
α F¯ξe(x)dx. (33)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Let ξ−1 = rs−α. The CCDF of the SINR distribution,
F¯ζ¯k(z), is
F¯ζ¯k(z) = Pr{ζ¯k > z} = Pr
[
ζ¯k > zI¯k
]
, (34)
(a)
= EI¯k,σ2k
exp
z (I¯k + σ2k)∑
ξ−1s
 ,
(b)
=
∫
0<ξ1<···ξK<∞
Lσ2k
(
z∑
c∈Φ¯c
x−1c
)
LI¯k
(
z∑
c∈Φc
x−1c
)
fξ(xc)dxc,
where (a) follows from the cumulative density function
of the exponentially distributed random variable ζ˜s with
mean
∑
ξ−1 and (b) is due to the expectation with
respect to ξ. The characterization of fξ(x) is omitted
here due to space constraints. The Laplace transforms,
i.e LI¯k follows from the proof of Lemma 1. The proof
concludes after substituting this Laplace transforms into
the integral in the above expression.
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